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Moral Crimes Post-Mellouli: Making a Case
for Eliminating State-Based Prostitution
Convictions as a Basis for Inadmissibility in
Immigration Proceedings
KERRY Q. BATTENFELD†
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2014, the Obama administration issued a
series of Executive Actions stating that it would shift the
focus of immigration enforcement to removing individuals
that posed a threat to “national security and public safety,”
and thereby reduce immigration action against families and
otherwise law-abiding non-citizens.1 An unfortunate
consequence has been an increase in deportations of
individuals who have committed minor or non-violent
offenses.2 Donald Trump made promises throughout his
† JD/MSW Candidate, 2017, University at Buffalo; B.Phil. Politics & Philosophy,
2007 University of Pittsburgh Honors College. Editor-in-Chief, 2016–2017,
Buffalo Law Review. Many thanks to Professor Tara J. Melish for her support
and guidance in writing this Comment, to Professor Rick Su for his helpful
feedback, and to the staff at the Sex Workers Project for planting the seed for this
Comment in my mind when I interned there in Summer 2015. Thanks also to the
Buffalo Law Review membership for their tireless work, and especially Neal
Johnson, for his careful attention and invaluable advice during the editing
process. And of course, to Matt, my partner in all things. Views expressed in this
Comment are my own, and do not represent the views of any other person or
organization.
1. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet:
Immigration
Accountability
Executive
Action
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov//the-press-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigrationaccountability-executive-action.
2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A PRICE TOO HIGH: US FAMILIES TORN APART
DEPORTATIONS FOR DRUG OFFENSES (2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/
06/16/price-too-high/us-families-torn-apart-deportations-drug-offenses.
Prior
Human Rights Watch studies of deportations showed that of the 900,000 nonBY
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campaign to deport two to three million immigrants with
criminal backgrounds, suggesting that this trend will at least
continue, if not increase.3 Jeff Sessions, in his prepared
remarks during his first trip to the border as Attorney
General, focused on the threat posed by criminal aliens,
stating “it is here on this sliver of land, where we first take
our stand against this filth.”4 He focused largely on those
with gang affiliations and histories of violent crime, but also
those who re-enter illegally, and more broadly, anyone with
a “criminal history.”5 This Comment focuses on the risk of
deportation and inadmissibility for one particular group of
non-citizens with criminal histories—those who have
engaged in prostitution. Convictions for prostitution stand as
a barrier to admissibility under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), either as a Crime Involving Moral
Turpitude (CIMT),6 or as evidence of a pattern of “engag[ing]

citizens with criminal convictions deported between 1997 and 2007, seventy-two
percent were deported for non-violent offenses. Id. (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS): NON-CITIZENS DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR
NONVIOLENT OFFENSES (2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_
material/forced_apart_charts_final.pdf). The total number of deportations under
the Obama administration has increased dramatically with Human Rights
Watch noting an eighty percent increase between 2008 and 2014 in deportations
of individuals with criminal convictions. Id. Despite this overall increase, in 2013,
only twelve percent of deportees had committed a serious offense, suggesting that
those with minor offenses continue to be the primary target of current
immigration policy. See id.
3. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Julia Preston, What Donald Trump’s Vow to
Deport Up to 3 Million Immigrants Would Mean, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/us/politics/donald-trump-deportimmigrants.html. Immigration advocates dispute Trump’s claims that there are
two to three million immigrants with criminal histories living in the United
States. Id.
4. Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Remarks Announcing the Department
of Justice’s Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement,
Nogales, Arizona (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-department-justice-srenewed.
5. Id.
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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in prostitution.”7 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or
the “Board”) and Immigration Judges (IJs) apply what is
known as the “categorical approach” to state convictions, to
determine whether a state statute categorically aligns with
a generic federal crime, such as a CIMT, as defined in the
INA.8 The categorical approach allows the IJ or BIA to look
only at the statute of conviction, as written, rather than to
the evidence or circumstances of conviction.9 This simplifies
the determination process, makes it more predictable for all
parties, and prevents the government from digging into the
trial record to find a basis for inadmissibility, but it also
limits the IJ or BIA’s ability to consider mitigating factors.10
This Comment addresses the use of state-based
prostitution convictions in immigration proceedings. It
begins with an overview of the Board’s treatment of
prostitution activity. It then presents two arguments that
call upon the BIA and the Administrative Appeals Office
(AAO) to reconsider the use of these convictions in
immigration proceedings. First, it argues that CIMTs are
defined by contemporary moral standards, which have
shifted such that prostitution should no longer be viewed as
morally wrong. Second, it addresses two recent
developments in the categorical approach that have the
potential to alter the use of prostitution convictions in
immigration proceedings. These developments are (1) the
2015 Supreme Court’s decision in Mellouli v. Lynch,11 which
further restricted the application of the categorical approach;
and (2) the consequences of that holding for the BIA in light
of Attorney General Holder’s order, issued several months
prior to the Court’s decision in Mellouli, requiring the BIA to
clarify its analysis of CIMTs, and resolve a circuit court split

7. Id. § 1182 (a)(2)(D)(i).
8. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015).
9. Id. at 1986.
10. Id. at 1987.
11. Id.
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on the matter.12 Finally, this Comment will consider the
impact of these arguments on victims of trafficking who face
barriers to qualifying for a T or U visa (the visas available to
victims of human trafficking and victims of other qualifying
federal crimes, respectively). While there is likely only a
small number of victims who cannot meet the requirements
of the T or U, they are nonetheless unjustly held accountable
for prostitution-related convictions that can only be waived
through the T or U visa application processes. Thus, even if
they qualify for some other kind of status, their record of
conviction resulting from their trafficking will remain a
barrier to gaining lawful status. Ultimately, these
arguments support the contention that the BIA, the AAO,
and IJs should adopt a per se rule that prostitution
convictions cannot serve as a basis for inadmissibility or
removability.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PERSPECTIVES ON PROSTITUTION
This Part looks at several BIA decisions involving
prostitution related activity and analyzes the BIA’s handling
of these cases. Section I.A describes a 1956 BIA decision and
a 2009 AAO decision, both of which involved applicants
raising duress defenses to their prostitution activity, and
discusses the disparate outcomes handed down by the
administrative entities adjudicating the cases. Section I.B
discusses another recent BIA decision that indicates the BIA
may be open to reconsidering its views on prostitution.
A. Agency Responses to Duress Defenses Regarding
Prostitution Activity
In 1955, a woman referred to simply as “M” in her
immigration record was placed in deportation proceedings
after she admitted to having engaged in prostitution in
Mexico for several months before arriving in the United
12. See Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 550 (Att’y Gen. 2015) (vacating the
opinion in Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008)).
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States.13 Engaging in prostitution was then, and continues
to be, a barrier to admissibility.14 M appealed the deportation
order, claiming that she was forced to engage in prostitution
and “that her fall from grace was brought about by fraud,
deceit, duress, and coercion.”15 The BIA, in its decision,
recounted the details of her testimony,16 and a story emerged
that today would likely be categorized as a form of human
trafficking under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA).17 The Board’s decision states that M and her five
siblings were orphaned, and it fell to M to provide for her
family.18 She was approached by two women at the
restaurant where she worked in Magdalena, Sonora and was
persuaded to move to Naco, Sonora to work as a waitress
under the guise that she would earn more money.19 Upon
arriving in Naco, she was told that she owed a debt to those
who arranged her travel.20 She was forced to work in a
brothel as a prostitute, yet she was never compensated
enough to pay her debt or pay for meals.21 She made several
attempts to escape, but permanently escaped only after she
had a promise of marriage from the man who later became
her husband.22 The Board believed M’s account, and accepted
her duress defense, finding that “those to whom respondent
was indebted reduced her to such a state of mind that she
was actually prevented from exercising her free will through
13. M–, 7 I. & N. Dec. 251, 251 (B.I.A. 1956).
14. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
§ 212(a)(12), 66 Stat. 163, 182–83 (1952).
15. M–, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 251.
16. Id. at 251–52.
17. Trafficking, as defined in the TVPA, includes inducing another person to
engage in sex work through “force, fraud, or coercion.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(2)
(2012).
18. M–, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 251.
19. Id. at 251–52.
20. Id. at 252.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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the use of wrongful, oppressive threats or unlawful means.”23
The Board relied on prior decisions involving duress and
ultimately terminated M’s deportation order holding that
“prostitution committed under duress would not support a
charge laid under section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.”24
More recently, a 2009 decision by the AAO distinguished
the BIA’s 1956 decision in Matter of M– from another case in
which the applicant claimed she “engaged in prostitution
under duress.”25 The applicant had been convicted four times
under New York State law for prostitution-related offenses.26
The applicant claimed that she was coerced to engage in
prostitution over a period of five years, and was made to
believe that her family would be harmed if she did not
comply.27 Her attorneys argued that she was subjected to
duress, and thus, was not inadmissible under the Board’s
reasoning in Matter of M–.28 The AAO disagreed, and
distinguished Matter of M–, stating that it was a case in
which the applicant admitted to engaging in prostitution, but
had no convictions.29 Here, the AAO reasoned that the record
of convictions meant that a defense of duress was not
applicable, but did not elaborate as to why this distinction
was warranted.30 Even so, the AAO waived the finding of
inadmissibility on the grounds that the convictions had
occurred over ten years before the application, and thus did

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. [Identifying Information Redacted by Agency] Petition: Application for
Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), 2009 WL 1742009, at *2 (Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. Jan. 16, 2009).
26. Id. at *1.
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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not present a bar to admission.31
These decisions are not easily reconciled, and it is not
obvious from the written record why a duress defense should
apply to one prostitution case, but not another. The 1956
decision evinces a concern that holding an individual
accountable for an action forced upon them would be
unjust.32 Yet, it is also possible that the Board was largely
influenced by the age of the applicant when she was forced
into prostitution—the decision notes that she was under 18
at the time.33 Another possible explanation is that the 2009
case followed the passage of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000.34 That Act was intended to provide
immigration options for individuals induced to provide labor
or sexual services through force, fraud, or coercion.35 The
existence of a viable legal option for individuals who meet the
federal definition of trafficking arguably vitiates the need for
administrative fixes to promote justice.
B. The BIA Acknowledges Changing Views on Prostitution
There is no statutory definition of a Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude, but the BIA has defined it as “an act which
is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong or
malum in se.”36 The BIA has also described it as “an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity.”37 The determination is not
based solely on “the seriousness of the offense nor the
severity of the sentence imposed . . . . It is rather a question
of the offender’s evil intent or corruption of the mind.”38
31. Id.
32. M–, 7 I. & N. Dec. 251, 252 (B.I.A. 1956).
33. Id.
34. 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012).
35. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b).
36. Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581–82 (B.I.A. 1992) (quoting Flores, 17 I. &
N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980)).
37. Id. at 582 (quoting 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 294 (1933)).
38. Id.
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While the BIA and the Circuit Courts have found crimes to
be CIMTs without evil intent,39 it is generally accepted that
some kind of willfulness is required.40 Put simply, a CIMT
“requires two essential elements: reprehensible conduct and
a culpable mental state.”41
The Board’s 2014 decision in Sehmi offers insight into
the BIA’s views on prostitution-related offenses.42 In that
case, the BIA clarified that the act of soliciting a prostitute
was not morally distinct from the act of promoting, or
working as a prostitute.43 The Board found the applicant had
committed a CIMT based on his solicitation convictions
under Florida law.44 However, the court noted
it has been many years since the Board has addressed, in a
precedent decision, the issue of whether an offense involving
prostitution represents a crime involving moral turpitude. In the
intervening period, views regarding prostitution have indeed
undergone a transformation in our society, and simple prostitution
in some states has become a regulatory offense and is a quality of
life crime to prevent public disorder.45

While the Board pulled back slightly from openly calling
for the re-categorization of prostitution offenses as CIMTs—
the Board upheld solicitation as a CIMT, citing to the
difficulty of ensuring consent between parties and the risk of
trafficking and related exploitation46—the discussion

39. Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec 1188, 1192–93 (B.I.A. 1999).
40. See Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A crime
involving the willful commission of a base or depraved act is a crime involving
moral turpitude”); Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is the
combination of the base or depraved act and the willfulness of the action that
makes the crime one of moral turpitude.”).
41. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 834 (B.I.A. 2016).
42. Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7 (B.I.A. 2014) (unpublished, nonprecedential decision).
43. Id. at *6.
44. Id. at *7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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indicates that the BIA may be open to new perspectives on
prostitution convictions under immigration law. This
Comment seeks to offer a justification for barring
prostitution related offenses from being categorized as
CIMTs. This justification is based on evolving moral
standards, concerns of racial and gender bias in prostitution
enforcement, and evidence indicating that the decision to
engage in prostitution is frequently an economic decision, not
a moral one, thereby undermining the basis for assuming evil
intent from a prostitution conviction.
The remainder of this Comment addresses the two
elements of CIMTs noted above—“reprehensible conduct and
culpable mental state.”47 Part II of this Comment seeks to
address why prostitution is not per se morally reprehensible.
Part III addresses the emergence of human trafficking
vacatur laws and what these laws imply about the
substantive and mental elements of prostitution convictions.
In particular, Part III explains why state prostitution
convictions may not incorporate the necessary criminal
elements to qualify as CIMTs or as instances of “engaging in
prostitution” under the INA.
II. VIEWS ON PROSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES—PAST
AND PRESENT
Views on prostitution have changed drastically since the
early twentieth century. Even so, there is still significant
stigma attached to sex work, and major racial and gender
disparities evident in law enforcement efforts directed at
prostitution. This Part discusses these changing views and
circumstances. Section II.A provides a history of prostitution
laws and societal views toward prostitutes in the United
States. Section II.B describes the recent movement to
legitimize sex work and promote the rights of sex workers,
and the implications of this movement on the assumption
that prostitution is a moral crime.
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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A. A History of Prostitution in the United States
Even in colonial America, prostitutes were viewed as a
public nuisance—called out as “fallen women” who lacked
virtue.48 From the colonial period up through much of the
nineteenth century, many states lacked prostitution laws,
but criminalized the behavior under public lewdness and
night walking statutes.49 Before prostitution was formally
criminalized by state statutes, the term “prostitute” had
varied meanings beyond one who sold sex for money—it
included women who had sex with men of a different race, or
who traded sex for goods.50 Prostitution was dealt with by
community members through “sporadic and unofficial
harassment.”51 From mid-nineteenth century into the early
twentieth century, several factors led to the statutory
criminalization of prostitution. First, the formation of police
departments and professionalization of policing passed the
responsibility for maintaining social order onto police.52
Next, the second wave of industrialization that expanded job
opportunities for men, but not women, and the corresponding
urbanization increased perceptions that prostitution was at
“epidemic” levels.53 Finally, the emergence of “social purity
and abolitionist groups” concerned about societal morals and
“white slavery” formed the basis of the Progressive Era
movement to “abolish prostitution through the intervention
of the state.”54
William W. Sanger authored a seminal study on the
history of prostitution and included his own research of
48. Elizabeth M. Johnson, Buyers Without Remorse: Ending Discriminatory
Enforcement of Prostitution Laws, 92 TEX. L. REV. 717, 721 (2014).
49. See id. at 720–21; RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION IN
AMERICA, 1900–1919, at 2 (1982).
50. ROSEN, supra note 49, at 1.
51. Id. at 4.
52. See id. at 4–5.
53. Id. at 39.
54. Id. at 12–13.
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prostitution in New York City in the late nineteenth
century.55 The assumptions inherent in his methodology are
an indication of the morality of his time. Sanger’s description
of a young woman entering prostitution assumes that women
are drawn to prostitution due to some deficiency of moral
character and their own vanity, and that over time they
become beyond repair:
Take, for example, the career of a female who enters a house of
prostitution at sixteen years of age. Her step is elastic, her eye
bright, she is the “observed of all observers” The habitués of the
place flock around her, gloat over her ruin while they praise her
beauty, and try to drag her down to their own level of depravity
while flattering her vanity. As the last spark of inherent virtue
flickers and dies in her bosom, and she becomes sensible that she is
indeed lost, that her anticipated happiness proves but splendid
misery, she also becomes conscious that the door of reformation is
practically closed against her. But this life of gay depravity can not
last; her mind becomes tainted with the moral miasma in which she
lives; her physical powers wane under the trials imposed upon
them, and her career in a fashionable house of prostitution comes to
an end; she must descend in the ladder of vice.56

Sanger notes that perhaps the most important question
in his survey is “What was the cause of your becoming a
prostitute?”57 He states that “the replies lay open to a
considerable extent those hidden springs of evil which have
hitherto been know only from their results.”58 Of the 2000
women surveyed, the two most common answers were
“inclination” (513 responses) and “destitution” (525
responses).59 Sanger writes that “‘inclination’ . . . can only be
understood as meaning a voluntary resort to prostitution in
order to gratify the sexual passion.”60 Other authors have
55. WILLIAM W. SANGER, THE HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION: ITS EXTENT, CAUSES,
(1858).

AND EFFECTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

56. Id. at 453.
57. Id. at 488.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id.
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noted that it is unclear whether the respondents understood
the meaning that Sanger attached to the response.61 He
assumes that this “passion” cannot be the sole motivation for
women to enter into prostitution as that “would imply an
innate depravity” and argues, “the full force of sexual desise
[sic] is seldom known to a virtuous woman.”62 Thus, she must
be morally corrupted even before her decision to enter into
prostitution, because no decent woman would chose such a
life.
By the early twentieth century, perspectives had shifted
slightly, or perhaps broadened, in that some women in
prostitution were viewed as victims in need of saving and
rehabilitation.63 The view of prostitution as a form of “white
slavery”
was
championed
by
nineteenth-century
abolitionists, and found national acceptance with the
passage of the Mann Act of 1910.64 The Act established a
means to penalize the perpetrators of this crime against
women.65 The term “white slavery” was apt not only because
it distinguished the modern form from the Atlantic slave
trade, but also affirmed the race-based and xenophobic
assumptions of social reformers at that time.66 These
assumptions found support from medical professionals like
Sanger, whose study indicated that the majority of
prostitutes in New York City were recent immigrants and
vectors of disease, supporting conclusions that prostitutes
were largely an immoral, “evil outside force, infecting and

61. HARRY BENJAMIN & R.E.L. MASTERS, PROSTITUTION AND MORALITY: A
DEFINITIVE REPORT ON THE PROSTITUTE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE SUPPRESSION OF PROSTITUTION 84
(1964).
62. SANGER, supra note 55, at 488–89.
63. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 722.
64. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2012)).
65. Mann Act of 1910, ch. 395, sec. 2, 36 Stat. 825 (criminalizing the act of
bringing a person across state boarders for the purpose of prostitution).
66. See ROSEN, supra note 49, at 49.
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invading the body politic.”67 The belief that prostitutes were
primary vectors of disease led the United States to step up
anti-prostitution enforcement near military bases to protect
the moral and physical health of officers.68 This practice was
repeated in the time leading up to World War II, despite
evidence that most soldiers contracted venereal disease from
sex with women known to them—not prostitutes.69 By 1925,
every state had criminalized prostitution, though
enforcement was often discriminatory70 and some state
statutes were gender specific.71 Discriminatory enforcement
of prostitution statutes was present even up into the 1970s.72
With the emergence of the gay rights movement in the
1970s, sex workers continued to find themselves labeled as
“deviant,” and not deserving of the same rights that gay and
lesbian individuals found themselves fighting so vigorously
for.73 The 1980s brought with it the AIDS epidemic, and sex
workers found themselves again labeled as vectors of
disease74—irresponsible and incapable of making sound
decisions for themselves.75 They were viewed as the primary
culprits for infecting society (no matter that their clients
were equally responsible for ensuring safe sex practices

67. See id. at 10, 13, 49.
68. Id. at 34.
69. ALISON BASS, GETTING SCREWED: SEX WORKERS AND THE LAW 23 (2015).
70. Johnson, supra note 48, at 720 (discussing how some states prosecuted
primarily women sellers of sex but not male sellers or purchasers).
71. Id. at 723 n.42.
72. See, e.g., MELINDA CHATEAUVERT, SEX WORKERS UNITE: A HISTORY OF THE
MOVEMENT FROM STONEWALL TO SLUTWALK, 70–71 (2013) (discussing how a San
Francisco, California judge dismissed thirty-seven prostitution cases because
police had arrested only women selling sex, but no male johns.)
73. See id. at 10–11.
74. See CHATEAUVERT, supra note 72, at 85–86; Priscilla Alexander,
Prostitutes Are Being Scapegoated for Heterosexual AIDS, in SEX WORK: WRITINGS
BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 248–63 (Frédérique Delacoste & Priscilla
Alexander eds., 1987).
75. See Alexander, supra note 74, at 248.
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through condom use).76 Even the CDC opted to focus on high
risk groups of people, rather than high risk behaviors, adding
weight to the assumption that prostitutes, long viewed as a
risk to the nation’s moral fabric, also posed a threat to its
health and safety.77
B. Prevailing Views of Prostitution Undermine the
Argument for Its Moral Reprehensibility
In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of
the rights of sex workers, and calls to decriminalize
prostitution. This Section addresses this emerging view and
the implications for continuing to treat prostitution as a
moral crime. It also considers an argument that state courts
have erased the mens rea requirement from prostitution
criminal proceedings,78 and posits how that erasure further
calls into question the use of these convictions as a basis for
inadmissibility as CIMTs.
1. Sex Work as an Economic, Not a Moral Choice
In August 2015, the International Council to Amnesty
International passed a resolution asking the board to adopt
a policy to promote the rights of sex workers through
decriminalization.79 This decision followed two years of
research based on recommendations from the “World Health
Organization, UNAIDS, and the UN Special Rapporteur on
the Right to Health,” and incorporated input from
international sex worker rights groups, anti-trafficking
organizations, HIV/AIDS prevention organizations, women’s
76. See id. at 256.
77. See CHATEAUVERT, supra note 72, at 85–86, 94, 100.
78. See Amanda Peters, Modern Prostitution Legal Reform & the Return of
Volitional Consent, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 16 (2015).
79. Int’l Council, Decision on State Obligations to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill
the Human Rights of Sex Workers, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/
en/policy-on-state-obligations-to-respect-protect-and-fulfil-the-human-rights-ofsex-workers/ [hereinafter Amnesty International Decision] (last visited Apr. 4,
2017).

2017]

MORAL CRIMES POST-MELLOULI

633

rights groups, and LGBTQ rights organizations.80 The
International Council urged the International Board of
Amnesty International to pursue decriminalization based on
[e]vidence that sex workers often engage in sex work due to
marginalisation and limited choices, and that therefore Amnesty
International will urge states to take appropriate measures to
realize the economic, social and cultural rights of all people so that
no person enters sex work against their will or is compelled to rely
on it as their only means of survival, and to ensure that people are
able to stop sex work if and when they choose.81

The Council urged that this position was consistent with
Amnesty International’s goals of recognizing and furthering
the basic human rights of all people, and working to end
discrimination in all its forms, further noting that
discrimination is often a driving force behind the decision to
enter into sex work.82
Following Amnesty International’s announcement, a
D.C. council member discussed putting forth a proposal
calling for the decriminalization of sex work in the nation’s
capital.83
New
Hampshire
has
also
considered
84
decriminalization.
The proposed New Hampshire
legislation would have removed sections from the state’s
prostitution and related offenses statutes that criminalize
solicitation, provision, purchasing, or profiting from
consensual commercial sex, while maintaining the

80. Global Movement Votes to Adopt Policy to Protect Human Rights of Sex
Workers, AMNESTY INT’L NEWS (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2015/08/global-movement-votes-to-adopt-policy-to-protect-humanrights-of-sex-workers/.
81. Amnesty International Decision, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. Patrick Madden, D.C. Councilmember Proposes Decriminalizing Sex
Work, WAMU (Aug. 14, 2015), http://wamu.org/news/15/08/14/dc_council
_member_proposes_decriminalizing_sex_work.
84. Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Prostitution Decrim Debated by New Hampshire
Lawmakers, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016, 11:00 AM),
http://reason.com/blog/2016/02/01/prostitution-decriminalization-debated-i.
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provisions criminalizing prostitution involving minors, and
prostitution compelled through “force or intimidation.”85 The
proposal was the result of bipartisan efforts by three female
legislators. In addition to numerous sex worker rights
organizations dedicated to decriminalization,86 the National
Association of Social Workers (NASW), the professional
organization for social workers in the United States, has
taken
a
formal
policy
stance
in
support
of
decriminalization.87
Even before the Amnesty International decision, some
U.S. municipalities had developed more realistic, human
rights-focused responses to prostitution. In 2011, Seattle,
Washington developed the nation’s first Law Enforcement
Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program.88 Designed primarily to
deal with low-level drug offenders, it allowed police to choose
to divert certain low-level offenders to services, rather than
booking them post-arrest.89 Those amenable to diversion are
referred to case mangers trained in harm-reduction
principles, and who do not push abstinence as a primary goal
for those with addictions issues.90 The municipal
government, police, and collaborating social service
organizations opted to include those arrested for prostitution

85. H.B. 1614-FN, 2016 Sess. (N.H. 2016) (proposing an amendment to N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2 (Prostitution and Related Offenses)).
86. Examples include the Sex Workers Project, http://sexworkersproject.org/;
Sex Worker Outreach Project, http://www.new.swopusa.org/; and Helping
Individual Prostitutes Survive, http://www.hips.org/.
87. DARRELL P. WHEELER & ANGELO MCCLAIN, Prostituted People,
Commercial Sex Workers, and Social Work Practice, in SOCIAL WORK SPEAKS:
NASW POLICY STATEMENTS, (10th ed. 2015) [hereinafter NASW Sex Worker
Policy].
88. KATHERINE BECKETT, SEATTLE’S LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION
PROGRAM: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIRST TWO YEARS 1 (2014)
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1185392/24777541/1398287318543/2014Lead-Process-Evaluation.pdf.
89. See id. at 9.
90. See id at 9, 11.
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offenses among those eligible for diversion.91 The city
justified the program by noting that the use of arrests and
convictions had done little to deter repeat offenders, and
instead, had potentially exacerbated the problem by making
it difficult for these individuals to access social services,
housing programs, and employment due to their many
criminal convictions.92 Despite these shifts at the municipal
and state levels, the United States remains “one of the few
industrialized nations to criminalize prostitution.”93
These policy shifts are evidence of the evolution of
societal views toward sex work and sex workers. The
discourse surrounding these policies and legislative efforts
centers on an understanding that sex work is sometimes a
choice, and sometimes not—it can involve varying degrees of
autonomy, risk, and violence. But most important, it
recognizes that there are many underlying factors that lead
people into sex work, such as poverty, addiction, abuse, and
lack of viable employment opportunities, among others.94
The choice is not inherently vile or depraved, rather, it can
be a rational choice given available options and personal
preference.
On the other side of the debate are those who express
concern for women and men who engage in sex work based
primarily on the assumption that all sex work involves
coercion, and thus, all prostitutes are victims.95 This seems
91. See id at 9.
92. SUSAN E. COLLINS ET AL., LEAD PROGRAM EVALUATION: RECIDIVISM
REPORT 4 (2015), http://leadkingcounty.org/lead-evaluation.
93. CHATEAUVERT, supra note 72, at 5. (“Sex work is legal in fifty nations,
including Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Macau, the Netherlands, Austria, New
Zealand, Israel, Germany, France, and England; it is legal with limitations in
another eleven nations, including Australia, India, Norway, Japan, and Spain.”).
94. NASW Sex Worker Policy, supra note 87.
95. Catharine MacKinnon is among the proponents of this view. See, e.g.,
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
13, 14 (1993). MacKinnon writes,
[a] recent study of street prostitutes in Toronto found that about ninety
percent wanted to leave but could not. If they are there because they
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to be the concern at the heart of the BIA’s reluctance in
Ranjit to definitively remove prostitution convictions as a
basis for finding a CIMT.96 But even this perspective on sex
work does not support the conclusion that the decision to
engage in sex work is an immoral one, rather, it views sex
workers as being on the losing end of an institution that
commodifies women and children for the sexual gratification
of others.
In weighing the validity of the commodification
perspective, it is essential to note the views of sex workers
themselves in characterizing the work that they do and its
social and economic value. First, it is important to note that
sex workers do not live “outside” the rest of society, but in
fact “typically have multiple roles . . . within family, more
mainstream employment, educational institutions, and local
organizations.”97 A 2005 study of thirty-seven sex workers by
the Sex Workers Project (SWP) found that “[m]ost
respondents entered the sex industry in times of financial
vulnerability.”98 Others became involved due to addiction,99
transgender discrimination, and other family and social

cannot leave, they are sexual slaves. Need it be said: to be a slave is to
be deprived of liberty, not to exercise it. To lack the ability to set limits
on one’s condition or to leave it is to lack consent to it
Id. As with the participants in Sanger’s study, it is not clear that the respondents
in the study MacKinnon referenced would attach the same meaning to their
response that MacKinnon does.
96. See Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7 (Aug. 19, 2014) (unpublished, nonprecedential decision).
97. JUHU THUKRAL ET AL., URBAN JUSTICE CTR., SEX WORKERS PROJECT,
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: AN ANALYSIS OF INDOOR SEX WORK IN NEW YORK CITY 18
(2005) [hereinafter BEHIND CLOSED DOORS].
98. Id. at 33.
99. JUHU THUKRAL & MELISSA DITMORE, URBAN JUSTICE CTR., SEX WORKERS
PROJECT, REVOLVING DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF STREET-BASED PROSTITUTION IN NEW
YORK CITY 31–32 (2003) [hereinafter REVOLVING DOOR]. It should be noted that
the rate of addiction and homelessness were significantly higher for street-based
sex workers than for indoor workers, suggesting that the experience and reasons
for entering sex work vary by population. Compare id. with BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS, supra note 97.
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pressures including domestic violence.100 In addition, many
of the respondents did not regularly engage in sex work over
long periods of time, but did so “in times of need.”101 This
points again to the fact that the decision to engage in sex
work is not a moral decision, but an economic one. One
respondent in the SWP report noted that the job provided her
with financial stability.102 Another respondent compared sex
work to low wage work like waitressing, and noted that
housewives provide childcare and sex to their husbands in
return for financial support.103 Thus, she did not see her
work as much different from other low wage work, except
that it paid better.104 That is not to say, however, that sex
workers are immune to the impact of stigma that the work
brings with it—many respondents noted having “mixed
feelings” about their involvement in sex work.105 These
perspectives of sex workers themselves contradict the
assumptions underlying the work of Sanger, discussed
above, and call into question the validity of relying on moral
standards originally codified in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952106 in assessing the economic
decisions non-citizens (many of who are not authorized to
work, and thus are prevented from working in legal sectors)
make today to support themselves and their families.
The implications of discriminatory enforcement and
violence toward sex workers, which often goes ignored
because of their precarious legal status and assumptions
about the moral worth of their work, are a true cause for
concern. Sex workers experience high rates of violence, both

100. See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 97.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Id. at 34.
103. Id. at 33.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 35.
106. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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from customers107 and police.108 The NASW policy statement
on Commercial Sex Work highlights several important facts
that support a contention that enforcement of prostitution
laws at the state level disproportionately impacts women,
transgender women, and women of color.109 Specifically, it
cites to World Health Organization data that,
demographically, commercial sex workers are ninety percent
female, and of those women, ninety-two percent are women
of color.110 Customers are overwhelmingly male—
approximately ninety percent.111 This data reflects
international trends in sex work, but U.S. based research
points to a similar trend—that women of color are routinely
profiled as sex workers.112 A 2011 study involving 220
transgender male-to-female Latinas in Los Angeles,
California, found that eighty percent had traded sex for
money, food, or shelter at some point, with thirty-one percent
identifying sex work as their primary form of employment.113
Moreover, enforcement continues to be unequal, with johns
receiving lighter treatment in certain municipalities than
the workers themselves.114 These disparities in enforcement
107. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 97, at 50–52.
108. See REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 99, at 36–38.
109. NASW Sex Worker Policy, supra note 87 (citing REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE
W. PAC., WORLD HEALTH ORG., SEX WORK IN ASIA 249 (2001)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Noah Berlatsky, Black Women Profiled as Prostitutes in NYC, REASON
(Oct. 1, 2014), http://reason.com/archives/2014/10/01/nypd-profiles-sex-workerstoo (referencing a study by the Red Umbrella Project on Human Trafficking
Intervention Courts in NYC). See also REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 99, at 35
(noting that women of color received more harassment from police than white
women).
113. FRANK H. GALVAN & MOHSEN BAZARGAN, INTERACTIONS OF LATINA
TRANSGENDER WOMEN WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 1, 3, 4 (2012),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Galvan-BazarganInteractions-April-2012.pdf.
114. Nicholas Kristof, Targeting the Johns in the Sex Trade, N.Y TIMES (Feb.
26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/opinion/kristof-targeting-thejohns-in-sex-trade.html.
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suggest that women of color and transgender women are
more likely to suffer immigration consequences as a result of
their participation in prostitution than white and cisgender
women. The disparate impact on these women speaks in
favor of removing prostitution as basis for inadmissibility,
rather than continuing the current practice under an
unproven assumption that criminalization protects victims
of trafficking.
2. The Mens Rea Requirement for Prostitution
Convictions Has Been Eroded, Thereby Undermining
Their Categorization as CIMTs
In a recent piece of scholarship, Amanda Peters argues
that prostitution offenses in the United States once
incorporated a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary prostitution that was lost over time, and
consequently, the crime has devolved into a strict liability
offense.115 Presently, most courts adjudicating state
prostitution statutes, look no further than “contractual
consent” (i.e., did the accused party offer sexual services in
exchange for compensation) and do not consider whether
there was “volitional consent” (i.e. consent to engage in the
illicit activity).116 Peters contends that it is essential for
courts to assess whether volitional consent is present
because it serves as the “basis for appointing blame and
moral culpability.”117 In her view, the recent emergence of
safe
harbor
laws,
affirmative
defenses,
and
vacatur/expunction laws that states have adopted in
response to the TVPA has reintroduced the concept of
volitional consent into criminal prostitution proceedings.118
An important question that remains is whether this

115. Peters, supra note 78, at 16.
116. See id. at 11.
117. Id. at 13 (quoting Samuel Vincent Jones, Human Trafficking Victim
Identification: Should Consent Matter?, 45 IND. L. REV. 483, 499 (2012)).
118. See id. at 35–38.
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“volitional consent” has been reintroduced in such a way that
can impact immigration proceedings. Because a CIMT
necessarily involves some degree of willfulness, or mens
rea,119 strict liability crimes generally do not qualify as
CIMTs, as criminal negligence is not sufficient.120 Only
certain limited crimes, such as statutory rape, qualify as
CIMTs although they specify no mens rea requirement.121
The fact that many state prostitution convictions may lack
true volitional consent, calls into question whether they can
reasonably serve as a basis for inadmissibility as CIMTs. If
no meaningful element of “willfulness” is present in the
statute by which the moral turpitude of the crime can be
assessed, it cannot qualify as a CIMT.
This argument could only be applied on a case-by-case
(or statute-by-statute) basis in immigration proceedings (as
discussed in the following Part), but in conjunction with the
argument outlined above—that the act of prostitution itself
does not necessarily involve moral turpitude—it may provide
a basis for categorically excluding certain prostitution
statutes as a basis for inadmissibly under the INA.
III. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH, VACATUR LAW, AND STATE
PROSTITUTION CONVICTIONS
Even if the BIA were to discontinue its categorization of
prostitution-related offenses as CIMTs under the INA,
“engaging in prostitution” would remain a basis for
inadmissibility. This Part explores a potential argument that
prostitution convictions should not serve as a basis for
inadmissibility either as a CIMT or as proof of a pattern of
“engaging in prostitution.” Following passage of the TVPA, it
came to the attention of various human trafficking service
providers that victims were often saddled with numerous
convictions for prostitution offenses (as well as other
119. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
120. See Perez Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615, 618 (B.I.A. 1992).
121. See Dingena, 11 I. & N. Dec. 723 (B.I.A. 1966).
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offenses) as a result of their trafficking, which prevented
them from obtaining lawful employment once they left the
trafficking situation. New York was the first state to pass a
vacatur law to correct this systemic deficiency.122 Many
states have since adopted some form of vacatur or expunction
law for trafficking victims. While useful for Trafficking
Victims, these laws point to a deeper flaw in the criminal
justice system—victims of trafficking, and other victims of
coercion and duress are frequently convicted of crimes which
they lacked the necessary intent to commit. This Comment
argues that state vacatur laws for trafficking victims stand
as legislative acknowledgment that the minimum conduct
criminalized by state prostitution statutes does not meet the
federal definitions of a CIMT123 or “engag[ing] in
prostitution,” and consequently, fails to satisfy the
requirements of the categorical approach.124 Stated
differently, these statutes are proof of a realistic probability
that the underlying prostitution statute criminalizes conduct
(such as trafficking) that does not fall within the scope of a
CIMT or “engaging in prostitution.” This argument is
grounded in the Supreme Court’s recent analysis of the
categorical approach in Mellouli v. Lynch. That decision,
discussed in more detail below, narrowed the scope of the
categorical approach and what inferences may be drawn
from the underlying statute of conviction.
A. The Supreme Court Narrowed the Application of the
Categorical Approach in Mellouli v. Lynch
Moones Mellouli was a Tunisian citizen who came to the
United States on a student visa in 2004.125 After receiving
122. MELISSA BROUDO, SEX WORKERS PROJECT, VACATING CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS FOR TRAFFICKED PERSONS: A LEGAL MEMORANDUM FOR ADVOCATES
AND LEGISLATORS 1 (2012), http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/2012/2012
0422-memo-vacating-convictions.pdf.
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A) (2012).
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (2012).
125. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015).
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master’s degrees in economics and applied mathematics, he
worked as an actuary and professor of mathematics at the
University of Missouri-Columbia.126 In 2011, he became a
lawful permanent resident and was engaged to a U.S.
citizen.127 The year before, “Mellouli was arrested for driving
under the influence and driving with a suspended license.”128
He was then found with four Adderall tablets hidden in his
sock, and consequently, was charged with trafficking
contraband in jail.129 The charge was later reduced to a
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia charge, to which
Mellouli pleaded guilty.130 His attorneys made an effort to
keep the description vague so as to avoid immigration
consequences for their client—the complaint did not name
the substance Mellouli had hidden in his sock, nor was it an
element of the offense.131 Nonetheless, after completing
twelve months of probation, Mellouli was detained by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and placed in
deportation proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having been “convicted of a violation
of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a
controlled substance.”132 The BIA affirmed the order of the
IJ, and the Eighth Circuit denied Mellouli’s appeal.133 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and subsequently vacated
the decision of the IJ.134
The Mellouli decision clarified the approach used in
immigration proceedings to assess whether state-level
convictions qualify as generic federal crimes that would
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1984–85.
128. Id. at 1985.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 1983–84.
133. See id. at 1985.
134. See id. at 1983, 1985.
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render an immigrant inadmissible or deportable. This is
referred to as the “categorical approach” which “looks to the
statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the
particulars of an alien’s behavior.”135 Further, the categorical
approach encompasses a “minimum conduct”136 standard,
under which the IJ must “presume that the conviction rested
upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized.”137
This standard emerged based on the language Congress
chose to use in the INA—referencing inadmissibility based
on convictions, not conduct.138 Further, it has the benefit of
simplifying the analysis that an IJ or the BIA must conduct
during immigration proceedings and “promote[s] efficiency,
fairness, and predictability.”139
The difficulty in Mellouli’s case centered around the fact
that the record of conviction did not specify the drug Mellouli
had concealed, and the Kansas State drug schedule did not
perfectly match up with the federal schedule—that is, there
existed a possibility that one could be convicted under
Kansas State law for possession of a drug that would not be
criminal under federal law. The government argued that
because the Kansas schedule of controlled substances
“substantially overlap[ped]” with the federal schedule,
Mellouli’s state conviction was “relat[ed] to a controlled
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).”140 Mellouli
argued that because there were nine substances listed on the
Kansas schedule that were not on the federal schedule, the
government could not categorically show that his conviction
was related to a federally controlled substance.141 The Court

135. Id. at 1986.
136. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2013).
137. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986 (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678,
1684–85 (2013)).
138. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
139. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986–87.
140. Id. at 1984.
141. See id. at 1984.
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ruled in favor of Mellouli, holding that the government must
prove “a direct link between an alien’s crime of conviction
and a particular federally controlled drug.”142 The
discrepancy between the state and federal drug schedule
created a “realistic probability” that the Kansas law could
lead to a conviction for crime that fell outside the scope of the
activity defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and therefore,
the conviction did not render Mellouli deportable. Instead,
the Court found that the categorical approach required
perfect overlap of the statutes in Mellouli’s case, because the
record of conviction did not specify the drug, and the
government could not show a direct link between the record
of conviction and a federally controlled substance.
B. Attorney General Holder Orders the BIA to Clarify Its
Application of the Categorical Approach Regarding
CIMTs
Immigration advocates have hypothesized how the
Mellouli holding, affirming a strict application of the
categorical approach with respect to federal drug schedules,
might be applied to other kinds of convictions that have
implications for admissibility and removability, such as the
INA’s CIMT provisions, or “engaging in prostitution,” for
example.143 The BIA, moving forward, will likely need to
incorporate the Mellouli holding into both its revised
approach to CIMTs and other applications of the categorical
approach.
The Mellouli decision came at a time in which the BIA’s
adjudicative process was arguably in flux. Just two months
prior to the Mellouli decision, outgoing Attorney General
Eric Holder issued an order to the BIA revoking a 2008 order
from Attorney General Mukasey that had empowered the

142. See id. at 1990.
143. See IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, MELLOULI V. LYNCH: FURTHER SUPPORT FOR
STRICT CATEGORICAL APPROACH FOR DETERMINING REMOVABILITY UNDER DRUG
DEPORTATION AND OTHER CONVICTION-BASED REMOVAL GROUNDS 13 (2015).
A
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BIA to go beyond the record of conviction in assessing
whether a state conviction qualified as a CIMT, and which
had led to a circuit split.144 The Mukasey order145 advised the
BIA to engage in the standard categorical inquiry to
determine whether the statute necessarily involved moral
turpitude, and then, if the Board was unable to arrive at a
decision, it could employ a second step, termed the “modified
categorical approach” that allowed the board to look to the
record of conviction to determine if the individual was
convicted of a CIMT.146 Then, if the Board was still unable to
determine if the crime constituted a CIMT, it was
empowered to assess “any additional evidence the
adjudicator determines is necessary or appropriate” to
resolve the question.147 The case that had generated the
opinion, Matter of Silva-Trevino,148 was sent back to the IJ,
who looked to outside information and determined that the
petitioner was inadmissible for having been convicted of a
CIMT.149 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, but when the
matter was passed up to the Fifth Circuit on appeal, the
Court vacated the BIA’s decision, holding that Mukasey’s
construction of the CIMT statute was not a permissible
one.150 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit joined four other circuit
courts in rejecting Mukasey’s recommendation to look
beyond the record of conviction.151 In vacating Mukasey’s
order, Holder advised the Board to address in future
decisions the process for assessing CIMTs and to determine
to what extent the modified categorical approach may be

144. See Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 550 (Att’y Gen. 2015).
145. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
146. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
147. Id. at 551 (quoting Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 704 (Att’y Gen.
2008)).
148. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
149. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 552 (Att’y Gen. 2015).
150. See id.
151. See id at 552.

646

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

applied in doing so.152
The BIA issued its response in October 2016.153 The
Board concluded that the categorical approach and modified
categorical approach were acceptable means of determining
whether a state law qualified as a generic federal crime, but
that is was not permissible to go beyond the record of
conviction and look at other extrinsic evidence to determine
whether or not an individual convicted under the state
statute had committed a CIMT.154 Further, the Board stated
that it would adopt the realistic probability test to assess the
minimum conduct necessary for conviction “unless circuit
court law dictates otherwise” for a CIMT.155 The Board noted
that two circuits in particular apply slightly different
versions of the minimum conduct analysis. The Third Circuit
uses a test that looks at the elements of the crime to
determine “the least culpable conduct hypothetically
necessary to sustain a conviction.”156 The Fifth Circuit,
where the Silva-Trevino case arose, utilizes a “minimum
reading” approach.157
Applying this test to the Silva-Trevino case, the BIA held
that Silva-Trevino’s conviction for “indecency with a child”
under Texas law did not constitute a CIMT.158 The court
noted that because the Texas statute “is broad enough to
punish behavior that is not accompanied by the defendant’s
knowledge that the victim was a minor, the offense does not
necessarily involve moral turpitude.”159 The Board arrived at
152. See id. at 553.
153. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. Oct. 12, 2016).
154. Id. at 830.
155. Id. at 831.
156. Id. at 832.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 827, 833–35. The Board noted that the 2004 law made it a criminal
act to “engage in sexual contact with [a child younger than 17 years] or causes
the child to engage in sexual contact.” Id. at 834 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 21.11(a)(1) (2004)).
159. Id. at 835.
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this decision on the basis that a CIMT necessarily involves
“reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.”160
Because the underlying state statute did not include a mens
rea element, the crime was categorically not a CIMT.
This analysis provides support for arguing that a
prostitution conviction cannot form the basis of a CIMT, not
only because the act itself is not reprehensible,161 but
because the underlying statute lacks the necessary mens rea
elements. This argument, however, requires a close analysis
of the state prostitution statute in question, and statespecific evidence to bring Peters’ argument to life—that the
process of conviction in the state in question has erased the
concept of volitional consent from the crime of prostitution.162
The next Section addresses in greater detail how one might
make such an argument.
C. Implications of Vacatur Law on the Categorical
Approach
Vacatur and expunction laws serve as legislative
acknowledgement that certain state statutes criminalize
trafficking-related conduct and therefore, do not necessarily
criminalize conduct that is a CIMT or other generic crime.
The Supreme Court, in its decision in Mellouli v. Lynch,
affirmed a strict application of the “categorical approach” for
analyzing state criminal convictions in immigration
proceedings.163 The Court explained that the “alien’s actual
conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry, as the adjudicator must
‘presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than
the least of the acts criminalized’ under the state statute.”164
The Supreme Court discusses this “minimum conduct”
160. Id. at 834 (citing Nino v. Holder, 690 F.3d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 2012)).
161. But see supra Part II for arguments explaining why prostitution is not
per se morally reprehensible.
162. See Peters supra note 78.
163. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015).
164. Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2013)).
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standard in its decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder, stating
our focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by a state statute
is not an invitation to apply “legal imagination” to the state offense;
there must be a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,
that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside
the generic definition of a crime.”165

However, under the reasoning in Mellouli, when a statute
explicitly criminalizes conduct that both would and would
not meet the requirements of a generic crime, the language
itself proves that the statute is not categorically a generic
crime under federal law.166
I argue that vacatur and expunction laws serve as proof
of a “realistic probability” that certain state statutes
criminalize trafficking-related conduct along with conduct
that meets the definition of a generic crime. While the
reasoning in Mellouli focuses on the language contained
within the criminal statute itself and related controlled
substance schedules, the holding does not preclude the BIA
or AAO from referencing a criminal procedure statute (where
vacatur and expunction laws are typically codified) as a basis
for finding a realistic probability of conviction outside the
scope of a generic crime. This view of the categorical
approach has implications for determining whether a
prostitution conviction is a CIMT or constitutes a pattern of
“engaging in prostitution.”
Post-conviction remedies such as vacatur and expunction
are available in a number of states.167 Their use is relatively
new,168 and many victims do not take advantage of these
165. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).
166. See Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1993–94.
167. See ADVOCATING OPPORTUNITY, FIFTY-STATE SURVEY: SAFE HARBOR LAWS
EXPUNGEMENT, SEALING, AND VACATUR PROVISION, WITH RELATED STATUTES
PERTAINING TO TRAFFICKED PERSONS (2015) (noting that thirty-nine states have
vacatur or expungement laws in place).
AND

168. New York passed the nation’s first vacatur law in 2010. See N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 440.10 (2016).
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remedies169 or face barriers to doing so (such as inability to
afford an attorney to assist with the lengthy court process).
Convictions vacated under state law are usually not held
against the individual in immigration proceedings.170 The
New York vacatur law states that convictions for prostitution
offenses can be vacated if the victim can show their
“participation in the offense was a result of having been a
victim” as defined under state or federal law.171 In passing
the New York vacatur law, the state legislature
acknowledged that victims were frequently improperly
convicted for prostitution offenses and sought to rectify that
by offering an option to vacate.172 The vacatur law stands as
legislative acknowledgment that there is a realistic
probability of a substantive defect in the underlying
proceedings—specifically, the statute allows for a victim of
human trafficking to be charged and convicted for engaging
in prostitution.
Similarly, Nevada’s vacatur law specifically references
the state prostitution statute as a crime which can be vacated
if the convicted person was a victim of trafficking.173 During
a hearing on the Nevada vacatur bill, a Nevada
Assemblyman noted that the bill would “attempt to
terminate
the
continued
victimization
of
these
individuals . . . . Should a young man or woman be able to
escape the trafficker, he most likely has been arrested for
prostitution or other crimes related to human trafficking.”174

169. New Jersey’s vacatur law was used for the first time in 2015. See
McCarter and VLJ Obtain First Vacatur Relief Under New Jersey Human
Trafficking Prevention, Protection and Treatment Act, MCCARTER & ENGLISH
(June 24, 2015), http://www.mccarter.com/McCarter-and-VLJ-Obtain-FirstVacatur-Relief-Under-New-Jersey-Human-Trafficking-Prevention-Protectionand-Treatment-Act-06-24-2015/.
170. See Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878, 879 (B.I.A. 2006).
171. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(i) (2016).
172. See N.Y. Assemb. Memo, B. A7670.
173. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.515(5) (2014).
174. Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 76th
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These statutes acknowledge that victims are convicted
without having actually committed, for example, “an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity,”175 in the case of a CIMT, or
“engaging in prostitution” which is defined as providing
sexual services “primarily for financial gain or for other
considerations of material value.”176 Rather, they
demonstrate an awareness that states convict people who
were forced to engage in sex work, without proving the mens
rea element of the crime—willfulness. These vacatur laws
further evidence that, at least in some cases, states convict
individuals of prostitution without proving the substantive
elements of the crime—that is, without distinguishing
between cases where one engages in prostitution for one’s
own financial gain as opposed to being forced to engaged in
prostitution because one is a victim of trafficking. As such, a
conviction pursuant to a state statute covered by a vacatur
or expunction law does not necessarily establish that the
victim was convicted of a generic federal crime (either a
CIMT or “engaging in prostitution”) and therefore, cannot
form the basis for inadmissibility.
While vacatur and expunction laws were developed to
address a complication for victims of trafficking,177 they point
to an underlying and widespread defect in criminal justice
proceedings related to prostitution convictions. Using Peters’
language, this defect is a failure to prove “volitional
consent.”178 The effects of this failure are multiplied in
immigration proceedings where there is an assumption
(under the categorical approach) that the necessary mens rea
element has been sufficiently proved at the state level, when

Sess. (Nev. 2011) (Comments by Assemblyman John Hambrick, Clark County
Assembly District No. 2).
175. Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581–82 (B.I.A. 1992) (citing 37 Op. Att’y Gen.
293, 294 (1933)).
176. 22 C.F.R. § 40.24(b) (2006).
177. See N.Y. Assemb. Memo, B. A07670 (2010).
178. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying discussion.
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quite often, it has not.179 This underlying deficiency is
concerning, as it calls into question the basic fairness of the
categorical approach as it applies to an entire category of
criminal behavior. IJs and the agency staff at the BIA and
AAO would be right to question the fairness of using
prostitution convictions as a basis for removability and move
to adopt a per se rule excluding their use.
At least one case has come up in the circuit courts
making a similar argument.180 In 2006, Gomez-Gutierrez
was charged and pled guilty to solicitation of prostitution
under Minnesota law.181 The law he was convicted of
violating made it a crime to “solicit[] or accept[] a solicitation
to engage for hire in sexual penetration or sexual contact
while in a public place.”182 Gomez-Gutierrez argued that
Minnesota’s Safe Harbor law for trafficking victims provided
a basis for arguing that there is a “realistic probability” of
convicting outside the scope of the criminalized conduct—
specifically, that because Gomez-Gutierrez could provide
examples of victims of trafficking who had been convicted
under the state’s prostitution laws, those prostitution laws
involved “categorical overbreath” such that they could not
form the basis of a CIMT.183 However, Gomez-Gutierrez had
been convicted of a solicitation offense, not prostitution
(accepting a solicitation, per the Minnesota statute), making
it difficult to analogize the argument regarding the Safe
Harbor law and trafficking victims to the specifics of his
situation.184 In addition, the other, non-trafficking cases he
used to make out his realistic probability defense included
solicitation charges where one party withdrew consent before
the transaction was completed, a line of argumentation

179. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying discussion.
180. See Gomez-Gutierrez v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 2016).
181. See id. at 1056.
182. Id. at 1056 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.324, subd. 2 (2006)).
183. Id. at 1060–61.
184. See id. at 1056.
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which Peters has noted, “[c]ourts have not been empathetic”
toward.185 The court did not reject Gomez-Gutierrez’s
argument (that there is a realistic probability that the state
conviction exceeds the scope of the federal generic crime)
outright.186 Rather, the court rejected the argument stating
that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the BIA had
abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.187 This
appears to leave the realistic probability line of
argumentation open to those convicted of prostitution, and
particularly, those who may also qualify as victims of
trafficking.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAFFICKING SURVIVORS
In addition to the rationales discussed above against
using prostitution based convictions in immigration
proceedings (based on evolving moral standards and a
narrow application of the categorical approach), there is a
separate justification as to why these kinds of convictions
should not be applied to survivors of trafficking. Trafficking
survivors are often forced to engage in criminal activity
against their will.188 When victims are forced into
prostitution, they are at high risk of arrest for crimes such
as prostitution,189 loitering, and disorderly conduct.
Traffickers may force or coerce the victim to steal, to
participate in the trafficking enterprise, or to lie to police and
immigration officials. Traffickers can then use the threat of
arrest to maintain control over the victim.190 When victims
185. Peters, supra note 78, at 10.
186. See Gomez-Gutierrez, 811 F.3d at 1060–61.
187. See id. at 1061.
188. See Oversight: Combating Sex Trafficking in NYC: Examining Law
Enforcement Efforts—Prevention and Prosecution: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Women’s Issues and Comm. on Public Safety, N.Y. City Council 1–2 (Oct. 19,
2011) [hereinafter Mogulescu Testimony] (testimony of Kate Mogulescu and
Katherine Mullen).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 7.
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are arrested, their traffickers may be present during the
court proceedings, and may even be paying the cost of the
defense attorney.
Some states allow evidence of trafficking to be presented
as an affirmative defense to a prostitution charge.191
However, an affirmative defense is likely to have limited use
to an immigrant victim of trafficking who, due to the force,
fraud, and coercion they are subjected to, combined with
limited language skills and knowledge of the American
justice system, may not feel safe enough to communicate
their situation to their defense attorney.192 Some may not
identify as victims, may blame themselves, and may not
recognize that they were trafficked until after leaving the
trafficking situation.193 Even when victims are aware they
are being exploited, they rarely have an opportunity to safely
disclose their victimization, and are forced to plead guilty.
Consequently, victims can accrue multiple convictions for
crimes they were forced or coerced to commit during the
course of their trafficking.194 Those forced into prostitution
are likely to accumulate prostitution convictions which may
then be held against them in immigration proceedings as
CIMTs or instances of “engaging in prostitution.”
While the T-visa allows victims to seek a waiver for
criminal conduct related to their trafficking, it is not a viable
option for all victims. But failure to qualify for a T-visa does

191. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.01; Prostitution; affirmative defenses (“In
any prosecution under section 230.00, section 230.03 or subdivision two of section
240.37 of this part, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant’s participation
in the offense was a result of having been a victim of compelling prostitution
under section 230.33, a victim of sex trafficking under section 230.34 of this
article or a victim of trafficking in persons under the trafficking victims
protection act”); see also ADVOCATING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 167 (listing
eighteen states with statutes creating affirmative defenses for human trafficking
victims).
192. See
The
Victims
and
Traffickers,
POLARIS
PROJECT,
https://polarisproject.org/victims-traffickers (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
193. See Mogulescu Testimony, supra note 188, at 6.
194. See id.
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not mean an applicant is not a victim of a severe form of
trafficking in persons. It may mean only that the victim does
not meet each of the four criteria to establish T-visa
eligibility, only one of which is that the applicant must meet
the TVPA definition of a victim of a severe form of trafficking
in persons.195 The victim may not be present in the United
States on account of the trafficking, may have declined to
cooperate with law enforcement, or may not face severe
hardship if returned to their country of origin.196
Victims should be able to seek other forms of relief that
they qualify for without being held accountable for crimes
committed against them during the course of their
trafficking, yet victims seeking options outside the T-visa
must show that they qualify for a section 212(h) waiver, or
go through a lengthy and costly process of vacating their
convictions. The 212(h) waiver requires the victim to show
that the conduct occurred over fifteen years ago and prove
rehabilitation, or have a family member that will experience
severe hardship if the immigrant is removed.197 While
vacating convictions may be an option, it is only available in
some states, and may only apply to certain enumerated
offenses.198 This has the effect of limiting immigration
options on a state-by-state basis, for similarly situated
applicants, based solely on their trafficking.
Protection from deportation and access to long term
immigration status is essential to victims’ physical safety,
psychological well-being, and social recovery, as many
victims face risk of serious harm or death if unable to remain
in the United States.199 When victims are penalized for

195. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I) (2012).
196. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2012).
197. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2016).
198. See ADVOCATING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 167.
199. See MELISSA DITMORE ET AL., URBAN JUSTICE CTR., SEX WORKERS PROJECT,
THE ROAD NORTH: THE ROLE OF GENDER, POVERTY AND VIOLENCE IN TRAFFICKING
FROM MEXICO TO THE US 16 (2012).
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trafficking-related conduct, it adds force to traffickers’
threats that victims will be viewed as criminals, or will be
deported if they try to escape, and undermines efforts to
encourage victims to come forward. In the case of victims who
qualify for some other form of immigration relief, the lack of
a waiver option forces the victim to abandon their original
claim. As such, the T-visa option does not fully satisfy the
standards to combat trafficking globally set out by the
United States in the TVPA to protect victims and ensure they
are not “inappropriately . . . penalized solely for unlawful acts
committed as a direct result of being trafficked.”200
Holding a victim inadmissible for a CIMT is
incompatible with a finding that the victim meets the TVPA
definition of trafficking because the victim could not have
acted with the necessary evil intent or moral
reprehensibility. Where a victim has established that they
meet the TVPA definition of a victim of trafficking, the BIA
should be precluded from also finding that the immigrant
has committed a CIMT. Traffickers often isolate victims from
sources of support to render them “defenseless and
vulnerable.”201 Traffickers also frequently use physical and
sexual violence, threats of violence, psychological abuse, and
coercion to force their victims to engage in conduct against
their will.202 A person acting under these circumstance is,
like the petitioner in Matter of M–, “reduced . . . to such a
state of mind that [the victim] was actually prevented from
exercising [their] free will through the use of wrongful,
oppressive threats or unlawful means.” Thus, where a victim
can show they meet the TVPA definition of a victim of a
severe form of trafficking in persons, they necessarily lack
the criminal intent (whether purpose, knowledge,
recklessness or negligence) for culpability. Consequently, it
is logically inconsistent to hold a victim of trafficking

200. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(19) (2012).
201. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(5) (2012).
202. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(6) (2012).
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inadmissible for a CIMT. Moreover, to do so would frustrate
the purpose and goals of the TVPA to not further penalize
victims. As such, where a victim can show they meet the
TVPA definition of a victim of trafficking, but seeks another
form of relief, the BIA should not hold them accountable for
prostitution based offenses that occurred during the course
of their trafficking. The 2009 AAO decision discussed above
fails to address this logical inconsistency,203 leaving victims
in a tenuous position, unless the general approach to
prostitution in immigration proceedings is altered.
CONCLUSION
Changing views of prostitution call into question the use
of prostitution convictions as a basis for removability under
the INA. Moreover, the widespread adoption of vacatur and
expunction laws in recognition of the fact that courts
regularly convict victims as perpetrators, raises serious
questions about the fairness of using those convictions in
immigration proceedings. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Mellouli provides an opportunity to make arguments that
not only should these convictions no longer be used, but they
cannot be used given that legislatures have acknowledged,
by enacting these vacatur laws, that there is a “realistic
probability” that these state prostitution statutes convict
conduct outside the scope of “engaging in prostitution.” For
this reason, IJs and the adjudicators at the BIA and AAO
should adopt a per se rule excluding the use of state-based
prostitution convictions, at least those originating from
states that have passed vacatur and expunction laws, as a
basis for inadmissibility. To do so would go a long way toward
promoting justice for vulnerable individuals, particularly
women of color and transgender women, in the U.S.
immigration system.
203. See [Identifying Information Redacted by Agency] Petition: Application
for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), 2009 WL 1742009 (Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. Jan. 16, 2009).

